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Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to critically assess the approach of Nigerian courts to 
interpreting section 42 of the Constitution. This article argues that Nigerian courts are yet to 
develop a substantive equality approach to interpreting section 42 of the Constitution. 
Rather, the courts have tended to adopt the formal equality approach to interpreting the 
section. Analysing some decisions of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, the 
article argues that in order to safeguard women’s rights and address gender inequality in the 
country, Nigerian courts should lean towards substantive equality approach to the 
interpretation of section 42 of the Constitution. This is not only consistent  with  Nigeria’s  
obligations  under  international  law  but  also  crucial  to addressing historical imbalances 
between men and women in the country. 
 
Introduction 
About two decades ago, the international community affirmed in Beijing that women’s rights 
are human rights and that states are obligated to prevent discriminatory practices that may 
impair women from enjoying their fundamental rights on equal basis with men.1 Since 
this affirmation, the international community has renewed its commitments at addressing 
discrimination against women. This is reflected in the adoption of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)2 and the 
Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women (African Women’s Protocol).3 More 
importantly, the recently adopted sustainable development goals (SDGs) aim at eliminating 
gender inequality and promoting women’s rights.4 Despite these positive developments, 
discriminatory practices against women stubbornly persist in many parts of Africa, 
including Nigeria. Discriminatory practices against women are reinforced by patriarchy 
and gender stereotypes. This is often exacerbated by deep-rooted cultural practices that 
regard women as second class citizens and deprive them of their basic rights. One of such 
cultural practices in the Eastern part of Nigeria does not accord the female child the right to 
inherit from her deceased father. This age-long controversial practice, sometimes referred 
to as the primogeniture system, has become subject of litigation on different occasions 
before Nigerian courts. It has been contended that this practice is inconsistent with Nigeria’s 
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obligations under international law and section 42 of the 1999 Constitution to address 
discrimination in all ramifications. 
 
The purpose of this article is to critically assess the approach of Nigerian courts to 
interpreting section 42 of the Constitution. This article argues that Nigerian courts are yet to 
develop a substantive equality approach to interpreting section 42 of the Constitution. 
Rather, the courts have tended to adopt the formal equality approach to interpreting 
section 42. Analysing some decisions of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, the 
article argues that in order to safeguard women’s rights and address gender inequality in the 
country, Nigerian courts should lean towards substantive equality approach to the 
interpretation of section 42 of the Constitution. This is not only consistent with Nigeria’s 
obligations under international law but also crucial to addressing historical imbalances 
between men and women in the country. 
 
Cultural practices and gender discrimination in Nigeria 
Cultural practices play an important role in the lives of many Nigerians. Some of these 
practices may have implications for the enjoyment of women’s rights. Given the patriarchal 
nature of many Nigerian societies, some cultural practices tend to perpetuate inequality 
and undermine women’s fundamental rights. Gender discrimination and stereotyping are 
fuelled by customary rules that construct boys and girls differently. For instance, while in 
many cultures in Nigeria, a child is cherished and viewed as a blessing from God, different 
importance is attached to male and female children. Among the Igbos, it is believed that 
children perpetuate a race or lineage, and in order to do so, children are expected to 
continue Igbo tradition and ways.5  Therefore, a distinction is made between a male and a 
female child, particularly with regard to inheritance matters. 
 
While a male child is entitled to the right of inheritance under Igbo customary law, a 
similar privilege is not extended to a female child. Such a discriminatory practice tends 
to diminish the value of a female child compared with her male counterpart. It can 
particularly become  a stumbling block to the realization of sexual and reproductive 
health and rights of Nigerian women. The CEDAW Committee has noted in its General 
Recommendation 31 that states should take appropriate steps and measures with a view 
to addressing harmful practices that may be inimical to the overall well-being of women.6 
 
Experience has shown that Nigerian society tends to privilege male sexuality over that of 
female sexuality. Thus, while boys are permitted to express their sexual desires, girls are 
expected to remain sexually passive. This is more or less due to the sociological 
construction of boys’ and girls’ roles in society. Due to this social construction, boys and girls 
are assigned different roles and responsibilities while growing up. Writing on the 
experiences of female students in Nigerian universities, Odejide (2007) has observed that 
female students are usually portrayed and treated as subordinates to their male counter- 
parts. She notes further that this is due to traditional cultures and social familial factors, 




surveillance and control of their behaviour. It is further revealed in Odejide’s study that 
female students’ sexual agency is limited as compared with their male counterparts by some 
cultural and traditional beliefs. 
 
A study has revealed that while boys may be permitted to go out and experiment with their 
sexuality so as to ‘discover things for themselves’, the sexuality of girls is often viewed in 
terms of ‘vulnerability, danger, and by implication inferiority’ (Izugbara, 2008). Izugbara 
(2005: 606) has summed up the subordination of women’s rights to that of men in the 
country as follows: 
 
The most pervasive and deeply entrenched culture or tradition of Nigeria is the role of 
women in society. In many parts of Nigeria, daughters from childhood are socialized into 
stereotypical roles. They imbibe an entire view of culture and society, aspirations bound by 
motherhood and wifehood functions with dispositions moulded in accordance with 
masculine/feminine dichotomy. While culture socializes daughters to be soft, meek and 
subservient, it socializes sons to be hard, aggressive and domineering. 
 
Cook and Cusack (2010) have explained that gender stereotypes relate to social and 
cultural construction of men and women as a result of differences in physical, biological, 
sexual and social functions. They further note that gender stereotypes are ‘the 
conventions that underwrite the social practice of gender’. It should be noted that 
‘gender stereotype’ is a broad term that refers to a ‘structured act of beliefs about the 
personal attributes of men and women’. As discussed below, ‘gender stereotypes’ can 
lead to discriminatory practices and thereby undermine women’s fundamental rights 
and freedoms. 
 
It should be noted that the rights to equality and non-discrimination obligate states to refrain 
from adopting laws, policies or practices that lead to distinctions, exclusions or restrictions 
on the basis of gender stereotypes. 
 
The principles of non-discrimination and equality under international law 
Non-discrimination and equality are two pillars of human rights recognized in 
virtually all human rights instruments. Although there is no universally acceptable 
definition of the term ‘equality’, it is generally accepted that equality is tantamount 
to non-discrimination. Therefore, an act of discrimination will lead to the violation of 
the right to equality (Shalev, 2000). Foremost human rights instruments contain 
provisions on non-discrimination and equality. For instance, Article 7 of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights provides that ‘All are equal before the law and are 
entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to 
equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against 





A distinction is usually made between formal and substantive equality.  The former 
implies that individuals are treated in the same manner regardless of their socio-
economic situations. The notion of formal equality is often traced to Aristotle (1980) who 
interpreted equality as sameness of treatment among equals, or treating equals equally 
or likes alike according to merit and their just deserts. Implicit in this explanation is 
that injustice would not follow when differences were recognized, and the different 
were treated in an unlike manner. Aristotle’s notion of equality would seem to endorse 
the practice of slavery and the patriarchal domination of a family headed by a male. 
Fredman (1996: 202) argues that formal equality is only interested in treating ‘men and 
women alike, irrespective of whether they are treated equally badly or equally well’. 
According to Barnard and  Hepple (2000), the formal approach to equality ‘embodies a 
notion of procedural justice’ that does not lead to a particular outcome. In essence, 
formal equality tends to turn a blind eye to existing structural differences in a society, 
which may predispose some groups to disadvantage. While formal equality aims at 
‘equalization of rights’, in reality it tends to deepen inequality in society. Goonesekere 
(2011) has argued that ‘The idea that “like should be treated as like,” legitimised 
differences in treatment based on ethnicity or sex. Since men and women were 
biologically different, and racial characteristics were different, different treatment was 
not deemed an infringement of equality’. 
 
On the other hand, a substantive approach to equality tends to treat individuals equally, 
taking into cognizance their peculiar circumstances. It strives at creating a level playing 
ground for all irrespective of their socio-economic background, gender or race. Fredman 
(1999) puts it succinctly; substantive equality ‘aims to equalize the starting point’. 
Generally, a substantive approach to equality is founded on the core value of 
accommodating people’s differences with the aim of achieving equality of outcome. 
Substantive equality is said to aim at realizing equality of result and equality of opportunity. 
In essence, substantive equality is concerned with achieving an egalitarian society. 
Sometimes realizing equality may mean treating those different the same, and in some 
situations, it may mean treating those who are different differently. A good illustration of 
the notion of substantive equality is contained in the opinion of Judge Tinaka of the 
International Court of Justice in the South West African case, where he notes as follows8: 
 
The principle of equality before the law does not mean ...  absolute equality, namely the 
equal treatment of men without regard to individual, concrete circumstances, but it 
means .. . relative equality, namely the principle to treat equally what are equal and 
unequally what are unequal ...  To treat unequal matters differently according to their 
inequality is not only permitted but required. 
 
From a feminist point of view, Minow (1988, 53) opines that ‘Equality requires same or 
different treatment, depending on the circumstances and the position of the individual in 
relation to his or her group-based systemic disadvantage’. Also, Cook and Howard (2007) 




development of an anti-discrimination approach that must take into cognizance their lived 
experiences as well as aim towards restoring their dignity. These views would seem to coincide 
with the notion of substantive equality. Although not all discrimination amounts to violation 
of rights, an adverse discrimination, which occurs when a person is being treated unfairly, is 
unjustifiable at law. It has been noted that a substantive equality approach should aim 
at correcting structural and entrenched disadvantage in society and, at the same time, 
aspire to maximize human development (Albertyn and Goldblatt, 1998; Fredman and 
Goldblatt, 2015: 314). Albertyn and Fredman (2015: 430) have identified a four-
dimensional framework for substantive equality. This includes addressing stigma, 
prejudice and violence; redressing socio-economic disadvantage; facilitating participation; 
and valuing and accommodating difference through structural change. It has been noted 
that committing to substantive equality requires the examination of the context of an 
alleged rights violation and its relationship to systemic forms of domination within a society 
(Albertyn and Goldblatt, 1998). Unlike formal equality, which does not recognize personal 
differences, substantive equality recognizes such personal differences and seeks to adopt a 
pragmatic approach to accommodate them. 
 
Human rights instruments specifically relating to women have adopted the notion of 
substantive equality. For instance, CEDAW (1979: Article 1) defines discrimination against 
women broadly to include: 
 
[A]ny distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or 
purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, 
irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any 
other field. 
 
States parties to the treaty are, therefore, enjoined to take steps and measures to 
eliminate discrimination against women within their territories. Its counterpart at the 
African regional level, the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women, 
requires states to remove practices that discriminate against women and urges states 
parties to take all appropriate steps to eliminate social and cultural patterns and practices that 
are discriminatory to women.9 Reaffirming the provision of CEDAW, the Protocol defines 
discrimination against women widely to include: 
 
[A]ny distinction, exclusion or restriction or any differential treatment based on sex and 
whose objectives or effects compromise or destroy the recognition, enjoyment or the exercise 
by women, regardless of their mental status, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all 
spheres of life. 
 
More importantly, Article 5 of the Protocol enjoins African governments to take 
appropriate measures including creation of public awareness on harmful cultural practices, 




who are victims of harmful cultural practices and protection of women at risk of harmful 
cultural practices. The CEDAW Committee in its General Recommendation 25 explains that 
to achieve substantive equality, some remedial measures may be necessary to address the 
historical disadvantaged position of women.10 It further requires states to adopt concrete 
measures to ‘address prevailing gender relations and the persistence of gender-based 
stereotypes that affect women not only through individual acts by individuals but also in 
law and legal and societal structures and institutions’.11 
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that both CEDAW and the African Women’s Protocol aim at 
achieving substantive notion of equality. In addition to these women-specific human rights 
instruments, freedom from discrimination is recognized in other human rights instruments. 
For instance, Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
guarantees the right to equality before the law and freedom from discrimination. The 
Human Rights Committee, responsible for the monitoring of the implementation of the 
ICCPR, in its General Comment 28 has explained that ‘Non-discrimination together with 
equality before the law and equal protection of the law without discrimination constitutes a 
basic and general principle relating to the protection of human rights’.12 In Nahlik v. Austria, 
the Committee explains that Articles 2 and 26 of the ICCPR obligate a state to ensure that all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction are free from discriminatory 
practices, whether perpetrated in private or public sphere. 13 
 
Under the African Charter, Article 2 provides that everyone is equal before the law and 
that no one should be discriminated against on grounds such as gender, religion, 
political beliefs or other status. Article 3 similarly guarantees to every individual the 
right to equality and equal protection of the law. The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights in Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia14 has noted as follows: 
 
Article 2 lays down a principle that is essential to the spirit of the African Charter and is 
therefore necessary in eradicating discrimination in all its guises, while Article 3 is important 
because it guarantees fair and just treatment of individuals within a legal system of a given 
country. These provisions are non-derogable and therefore must be respected in all 
circumstances in order for anyone to enjoy all the rights provided under the African Charter. 
 
This statement captures the broad understanding of the African Commission on the 
principles of equality and non-discrimination. It summarizes the importance of realizing the 
notion of substantive equality in any society. 
 
The  approach  of  Nigerian  courts to section 42 of  the Constitution 
The non-discrimination provision of the Nigerian Constitution of 1999 can be found in 





1. A citizen of Nigeria of a particular community, ethnic group, place of origin, sex, 
religion or political opinion shall not by reason only that he is such a person: 
a) be subjected either expressly by, or in the practical application of, any law in force in 
Nigeria or any executive or administrative action of the government, to disabilities or 
restrictions to which citizens of Nigeria of other communities, ethnic groups, places of 
origin, sex, religions, or political opinions are not made subject; or 
b) be accorded either expressly by, or in the practical application of, any law in force in 
Nigeria or any such executive or administrative action, any privilege or advantage that is not 
accorded to citizens of Nigeria of other communities, ethnic groups, places of origin, sex, 
religions or political opinions. 
2. No citizen of Nigeria shall be subjected to any disability or deprivation merely by reason 
of the circumstances of his birth. 
 
From this provision, certain points need to be made. First, the prohibited grounds for 
discrimination under the section should not been construed as exhaustive. In other words, a 
purposive rather than a restrictive interpretation should be applied to this provision. 
Second, the section covers both legislative and administrative acts capable of leading to 
discrimination on the prohibited grounds. Third, unlike some constitutions in Africa,15 this 
section is not qualified or made subservient to the application of customary law. It should be 
noted that section 1(3) provides that the Constitution is supreme and that any law that is 
inconsistent with it will be null and void according to its inconsistency. Fourth, the 
provision also prohibits discrimination on ‘circumstances of birth’ a phrase hardly found in 
other non-discrimination provision of other constitutions in Africa. This provision is aimed 
at specifically addressing discriminatory attitudes against children born out of wedlock. 
Fifth, the provision would seem to address both direct and indirect discrimination. This is 
commendable and important in relation to gender discrimination. Sixth, the language of the 
provision (use of the pronoun ‘he’) is gender biased. It has been criticized, and rightly so, for 
being gender insensitive. On a few occasions, Nigerian courts have had the opportunity to 
interpret this provision. While some of the decisions are commendable, others leave much to 
be desired as they either fail to clearly formulate a consistent approach to interpreting section 
42 or adopt a substantive equality approach. In Uzoukwu v. Ezeonu,16 the Nigerian Court of 
Appeal held, among other things, that ht to non-discrimination of the Constitution 
presupposes first that the discrimination complained against must have been based on 
law; second, it must flow from the act of government or its agencies; third, it does not apply to 
other Nigerians, and finally, that it can only be invoked if the conditions therein provided are 
the only reasons for discriminating against the individual.17 Without doubt, this is a 
restrictive and formal equality approach to interpreting the provision of the Constitution. It 
will not in any way benefit vulnerable and marginalized groups that deserved to be 
protected under the Constitution. Limiting the acts of discrimination prohibited to only 
those of government or its agencies would seem to be insensitive to the needs of women who 
may experience discriminatory practices from family members. Indeed, most of the 






In the latter case of Mojekwu v. Mojekwu,18  the Court of Appeal in condemning a cultural 
practice among the Igbo that denies rights of inheritance to a female child notes as follows: 
 
.. . We hear of and read about customs which discriminate against the womenfolk in this 
country. They are regarded inferior to the men folk. Why should it be so? All human beings –
male and female – are born into a free world and are expected to participate freely, without 
any inhibition on grounds of sex; and this is constitutional. Any form of societal 
discrimination on grounds of sex; apart from being unconstitutional, is an antithesis to a 
society built on the tenets of democracy, which we have freely chosen as a people.19 
 
While this decision has been lauded as progressive and capable of advancing women’s 
rights under the Nigerian Constitution, it fails to formulate the proper approach to adopt in 
determining a violation of the non-discrimination provision of the Constitution. Moreover, it 
is merely concerned at ensuring that both male and female children are treated in the same 
way under customary law but does not deal with the effects or consequences of 
differential treatment. In essence, the court adopts a formalistic approach to equality 
without clearly reflecting the lived experiences of women who are daily subjected to 
discriminatory practices. Beyond a ‘sympathetic’ approach to discrimination against women, 
what is required is a rigorous analysis of the non-discrimination provision of the constitution 
in a way that mitigates its negative impacts on women. 
 
In Ukeje v. Ukeje,20  the Supreme Court was called upon to determine a number of issues 
including the Igbo cultural practice that denies inheritance rights to female children. In that 
case one, Lazarus Ukeje had died intestate living a wife and four children. The 
respondent/plaintiff happened to be one of the female children of the deceased. She brought 
an action against the appellants/defendants-mother and son-who had obtained letters of 
administration over the deceased estate without the respondent’s knowledge. The 
respondent/defendant had claimed that as one of the daughters of the deceased, she was 
entitled to sharing in the estate of her late father. Some of the issues before the Supreme 
Court were whether the respondent/defendant as the daughter of the deceased, though born 
outside wedlock, was entitled to sharing in the estate of her deceased father and whether 
letters of administration obtained by the appellant/plaintiffs were legal and valid. The trial 
court had denounced the Igbo customary law, which does not recognise a female child as 
entitle to share in the estate of her late father. This decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal. 
On further appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held that the Igbo customary law that denies 
inheritance rights to female children was inconsistent with section 42 of the Nigerian 
Constitution. In arriving at this decision, Justice Rhodes-Vivour JSC on behalf of the Court 
notes as follows: 
 
No matter the circumstances of the birth of a female child, such a child is entitled to an 
inheritance from her late father’s estate. Consequently, the Igbo customary law which 




breach of section 42(1) and (2) of the Constitution, a fundamental rights provision 
guaranteed to every Nigerian. The said discriminatory customary law is void as it conflicts 
with section 42(1) and (2) of the Constitution.21 
 
Concurring with his learned brother Ogunbiyi JSC notes as follows: 
 
The trial court, I hold, did rightly declare as unconstitutional, the law that dis-inherits 
children from their deceased father’s estate. It follows therefore that the Igbo native law 
and custom which deprives children born out of wedlock from sharing the benefit of their 
father’s estate is conflicting with section 42(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). The reproduction of the section states thus:- ‘42(2) No citizen of 
Nigeria shall be subjected to any disability or deprivation merely by reason of the 
circumstances of his birth’.22 
 
This position of the court is much more progressive than the earlier case of Mojekwu v. 
Iwuchukwu, where the Supreme Court failed to find that a similar cultural practice 
impugns the right to non-discrimination of women.23 Indeed, the Supreme Court had 
berated the justices of the Court of Appeal for declaring the primogeniture practice a 
violation of women’s rights to non-discrimination. By so holding, the Supreme Court 
missed a great opportunity to clarify the nature and scope of the non-discrimination 
provision of the Constitution. Mojekwu case presented the Supreme Court an opportunity to 
develop the non-discrimination jurisprudence of the Constitution. Sadly, however, the 
Supreme Court filtered away this opportunity. Commentators have been highly critical of 
the conservative and ‘lacklustre’ position of the Supreme Court in that case (Chinwuba, 
2015; Durojaye, 2013). 
 
While the Supreme Court in Ukeje found that the Igbo cultural practice, which denies female 
children rights of inheritance, constitutes a gross violation of the right to non- 
discrimination, the reasoning falls short of a convincing jurisprudence on equality under the 
Nigerian Constitution. Beyond declaring the cultural practice as being in violation of section 
42 of the Constitution, the Court did not provide reasons for its decision. Some questions 
further need clarifications. For instance, given that the prohibited grounds of discrimination 
in section 42 are couched in a restrictive language, it will be important for the Supreme Court 
to clarify which acts are covered or not covered. If a member of a marginalized or 
vulnerable group approaches the court seeking for justice under section 42, what should be 
the starting point in determining whether unfair discrimination has occurred against such a 
person? When will an act or measure amount to unfair discrimination under the 
Constitution? What should be taken into consideration in determining whether there has 
been a violation of section 42 of the Constitution? This is even so given that Nigeria has 
ratified international and regional human rights instruments that subscribe to a substantive 
approach to equality. More importantly, what should be the place of Articles 2 and 3 of the 
African Charter, which has been domesticated in Nigeria? The approach of the Supreme 




substantive equality approach. From the reasoning of the court, the important 
consideration is that both female and male children should have equal rights to 
inheritance and nothing more. This is a formalistic approach to equality-treating equals as 
equal. Rebouche (2009: 725) has noted that the essence of a substantive equality approach 
is to achieve equality of result and redistribute resources and power between men and 
women. The Court fails to appreciate the historical disadvantage of women often 
perpetuated by patriarchy in the country. As noted earlier, true justice cannot be achieved 
by adhering to formal equality. The Court could have engaged in a robust and nuanced 
analysis of the provision of section 42 vis-à -vis the Igbo cultural practice that denies rights 
of inheritance to a female child with a view to contextualizing its negative impact on 
women. An enquiry into how women have historically been denied property rights and 
ownership of land as a result of patriarchy and the consequent pauperization of women 
could have been more appealing (Albertyn and Goldblatt, 1998). 
 
The failure of the Supreme Court to develop a non-discrimination test has created a gap in 
the jurisprudence of the country. Moreover, it is capable of leading to inconsistency in the 
approach of courts while interpreting section 42. For instance, a Federal High Court in 
Odafe case held that the denial of healthcare services to four prisoners living with HIV was 
not in violation of section 42 of the Constitution since health status is not one of the 
prohibited grounds for non-discrimination. This decision has been criticized for its narrow 
approach to interpreting section 42 of the Constitution (Durojaye, 2007). To avoid a 
similar occurrence, it is imperative that the Supreme Court develops a pragmatic guideline 
in interpreting the non-discrimination provision of section 42. Such an approach must be 
consistent with the notion of substantive equality. In particular, it must be assuring and 
serves as a beacon of hope to vulnerable and marginalized groups. 
 
Lessons from other jurisdictions 
Following the inconsistent approach by Nigerian courts to the interpretation of the non-
discrimination provision in section 42, some lessons can be learned from other 
jurisdictions where substantive equality approach has been applied to interpreting non-
discrimination provision of the constitution. In this regard, one can draw lessons from the 
approaches of the courts in South Africa and Canada. The South African Constitutional 
Court in Harsken and Lane,24 where the constitutionality of sections 21, 64 and 65 of 
Insolvency Act vis-à -vis section 8 of the Interim Constitution was the issue before the court, 
has elaborated on this issue. While interpreting the equality clause in section 8 of the Interim 
Constitution (similar to section 9 of the 1996 Constitution),25 the Court made a distinction 
between discrimination and unfair discrimination. According to Goldstone J, discrimination 
is pejoratively referred to as an unequal treatment of people based on attributes and 
characteristics attaching to them. On the other hand, unfair discrimination is described as 
treating persons differently in a way which impairs their fundamental dignity as human 
beings, who are inherently equal in dignity.26 The Court further laid down the factors to 
consider in determining unfairness of discrimination in accordance with section 8 of the 





1. The position of the victim in the society. 
2. The purpose sought to be achieved by the discrimination. 
3. The extent to which the rights and interest of the victims of discrimination has been 
affected. 
4. Whether the discrimination has impaired the human dignity of the victim. The 
Court, quoting from its earlier decision in Hugo case27, said as follows: 
 
The prohibition of unfair discrimination in the interim Constitution seeks not only to avoid 
discrimination against people who are members of disadvantaged groups. It seeks more than 
that. At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies recognition that the purpose 
of our new constitutional and democratic order is the establishment of a society in which all 
human beings will be accorded equal dignity and respect regardless of their membership of 
particular groups .. . 
 
This statement is very important in that it underscores the relevance of respect for human 
dignity as the foundation of the prohibition of discrimination. More importantly, the 
statement is particularly relevant in the context of addressing gender inequality in the 
country. In Hugo case, the Constitutional Court was asked to consider the constitutionality 
of the president’s pardon given to women prisoners who had children under the age of 12 as 
against their male counterparts. The High Court had ruled that the president’s action 
amounted to discrimination against male prisoners who had children under 12. However, 
on appeal to the Constitutional Court, the majority of the Court reasoned that given the 
peculiar situation of women and the role they play in society, the president’s action was not 
discriminatory. In justifying its position, the court noted as follows: 
 
For many South African women, the difficulties of being responsible for the social and 
economic burdens of child rearing, in circumstances where they have few skills and scant 
financial resources are immense. The failure by fathers to shoulder their share of the 
financial and social burden of child rearing is a primary cause of this hardship. The result of 
being responsible for children makes it more difficult for women to compete in the labour 
market and is one of the causes of the deep inequalities experienced by women in 
employment .. . It is unlikely that we will achieve a more egalitarian society until 
responsibilities for child rearing are more equally shared.28 
 
This reasoning of the Constitutional Court is consistent with substantive equality 
approach, which is aimed at ensuring egalitarianism in society. This can only be 
achieved if special measures are taken to address the disadvantage of the past. The Court 
would seem to have put into perspective the peculiar challenges women encounter with to 
childbearing and rearing. In other words, the Court had taken into consideration the 





The test formulated by the Court in Harken case serves as the benchmark for 
determining unfair discrimination and when the equality provision of the Constitution has 
been violated. The Court had laid down a useful and unambiguous threshold which must 
guide any enquiry into the violation of the equality clause of the Constitution. It is consistent 
with substantive equality approach as it is not merely concerned with the ‘form’ but also 
takes into cognizance the historical experiences of disadvantaged and vulnerable persons. 
In essence, this test addresses both de facto and de jure discrimination. This approach by 
the Constitutional Court is commendable as it has provided certainty and consistency in 
the interpretation of the equality clause of the South African Constitution. 
 
With specific reference to the impact of cultural practice on section 9 of the 
Constitution, the Constitutional Court has had the opportunity to address this in Bhe 
& Others v. Magistrate Khayelitsha.29 In that case, the Constitutional Court in 
condemning a customary practice that denies inheritance rights to the girl child notes as 
follows: 
 
The exclusion of women from heirship and consequently from being able to inherit property 
was in keeping with a system dominated by a deeply embedded patriarchy which reserved for 
women a position of subservience and subordination and in which they were regarded as 
perpetual minors under the tutelage of the fathers, husbands, or the head of the extended 
family .. . The principle of primogeniture also violates the right of women to human dignity as 
guaranteed in section 10 of the Constitution as, in one sense, it implies that women are not fit 
or competent to own and administer property. 
 
The South African jurisprudence on equality has substantially been influenced by decisions 
from Canadian courts. For instance, the Canadian Supreme Court has enumerated in Law v. 
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration30, known as the Law Test), crucial 
factors that must be considered before establishing unfair discrimination under section 15 of 
the Canadian Constitution. First, the position of the complainant in the society (i.e., whether 
or not the complainant has been a disadvantaged person in the society) will need to be 
considered. Second, the purpose of the differentiation must be explored, that is, did the law 
aim to achieve a vital societal goal in favour of one who is vulnerable or had been 
disadvantaged? Third, the impact of the differentiation on the rights of the complainant 
must be ascertained, that is, does the law impact adversely on his/her fundamental human 
dignity? The Court further emphasized in that case that the paramount consideration in 
determining the violation of the equality clause of the Constitution is the protection of the 
dignity of the complainant. This approach of the Canadian Supreme Court is aimed at 
ensuring substantive equality and can be beneficial to Nigerian courts. The approach can be 
applied to affirm the right to equality of women, especially in relation to customary 
practices that denies right of inheritance to women and girls. Given that sociocultural 
factors often perpetuate low status of women in Nigeria, a proper interpretation of section 





Furthermore, in Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney-General),31 the Canadian 
Supreme Court has demonstrated the importance of substantive equality in access to 
healthcare services for vulnerable groups. In that case, some of the issues before the Court 
were premised on whether sections 3, 5 and 9 of the Hospital Insurance Act and the 
Regulations infringed section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights by failing to require 
hospitals to provide medical interpreter services for the deaf, and if the answer was in the 
affirmative, whether the impugned provisions were saved under section 1 of the Charter. The 
court held that failure to provide facility for sign language interpretation that would assist 
hearing-impaired patients to communicate with health service providers in the same way as 
unimpaired patients constitutes discrimination in violation of the Canadian Charter on 
Rights and Freedoms. According to the Court, the adverse effects of discrimination are 
relevant in the context of people with disabilities. The Court further explained that: 
 
In the present case the adverse effects suffered by deaf persons stem not from the imposition 
of a burden not faced by the mainstream population, but rather from a failure to ensure that 
deaf persons benefit equally from a service offered to everyone. Once it is accepted that 
effective communication is an indispensable component of the delivery of a medical service, 
it is much more difficult to assert that the failure to ensure that deaf persons communicate 
effectively with their health care providers is not discriminatory. To argue that 
governments should be entitled to provide benefits to the general population without 
ensuring that disadvantaged members of society have the resources to take full advantage of 
those benefits bespeaks a thin and impoverished vision of s. 15(1). It is belied, more 
importantly, by the thrust of this Court’s equality jurisprudence.32 
 
The Court summarized its position by noting that ‘the principle that discrimination can 
accrue from failure to take positive steps to ensure that disadvantaged groups benefit equally 
from services offered to the general public is widely accepted in human rights field’.33 
 
This decision is relevant in ensuring equality for all and in particular for marginalized groups 
such as women and people with disabilities in realizing their rights. Moreover, it 
demonstrates that, where necessary, special attention may be to be given to the situation of 
women and girls in society. This is because socio-cultural practices within Nigerian society 
tend to repress the sexual autonomy of women and treat them as inferior to men. The 
decision also confirms the fact that courts have an important role to play in holding 
governments accountable for failing to realize equality of result for vulnerable and 
marginalized members of society. 
 
The positions of South African and Canadian courts with regard to equality 
jurisprudence discussed above can be of help in interpreting section 42 of the Nigerian 
Constitution. Nigerian courts can draw inspiration from the decisions of the Canadian 
courts by ensuring that an analysis of section 42 of the Constitution takes into 




of women. More importantly, the interpretation can be adopted to guarantee social justice 
for women who continue to experience discrimination in all facets of life. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has shown that Nigerian courts are yet to embrace the substantive equality 
approach in interpreting the non-discrimination provision of the Constitution. Although 
progress has been made in addressing discriminatory practices against women in recent 
times, the approach of the courts leaves much to be desired. Adopting a substantive 
equality approach to interpreting section 42 of the Nigerian Constitution is important in the 
sense that it can go a long in protecting the rights of vulnerable and marginalized groups. 
More importantly, it can provide a bulwark to gender-based discrimination often perpetuated 
against women as a result of cultural practices. The courts are often regarded as the last hope 
of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups in society. Therefore, for Nigerian courts to truly 
live up to this role, a substantive equality approach to interpreting section 42 of the 
Constitution is imperative. In this regard, courts in Nigeria can draw inspirations from South 
Africa and Canada where the courts have been more progressive in adopting a substantive 
equality approach to interpreting non-discrimination provisions of their constitutions. 
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